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A MORE PERFECT PICKERING TEST: JANUS V. AFSCME 
COUNCIL 31 AND THE PROBLEM OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEE 
SPEECH
Alexandra J. Gilewicz*
ABSTRACT
In June 2018, the Supreme Court issued its long-awaited—and, for the 
American labor movement, long-feared—decision in Janus v. AFSCME Council 
31. The decision is expected to have a major impact on public sector employee 
union membership, but could have further impact on public employees’ speech 
rights in the workplace. Writing for the majority, Justice Samuel Alito’s broad 
interpretation of whether work-related speech constitutes a “matter of public 
concern” may have opened the floodgates to substantially more litigation by 
employees asserting that their employers have violated their First Amendment 
rights. Claims that would have previously been unequivocally foreclosed may now 
be permitted. This Note proposes a test to allow courts to meaningfully respond to 
this influx of claims. By explicitly incorporating the “social value” of public 
employee speech into the Pickering balance test as a factor of equal weight 
alongside the existing factors—the individual employee’s right to speech and the 
employer’s interest in operating an effective workplace—courts can make 
meaningful sense of the doctrinal conflict Janus created while also respecting and 
promoting the unique role public employee speech plays in public discourse.
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INTRODUCTION
In the final days of its 2018 term, the United States Supreme 
Court decided Janus v. AFSCME Council 31,1 a concerted effort that 
had been several years in the making. A series of Supreme Court 
decisions in the previous decade laid the groundwork for this 
monumental judgment, rejecting decades of precedent and em-
bracing the conservative majority’s radical interpretation of the 
First Amendment.2 Decades earlier, in Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ.,3
the Court upheld the so-called agency fee arrangement, which 
permitted public sector unions to collect “fair share” fees to cover 
the union’s cost of collective bargaining on behalf of all employ-
ees. In Janus, the Court overruled this longstanding precedent by 
holding that public sector employees could not be compelled by 
their union to pay agency fees without violating First Amendment 
protections against compelled speech.4 Commentators mused on 
the case’s likely impact on the collective power of organized labor 
in the workplace, anticipating an exodus of paying union members 
who would now recognize that they will be able to reap the benefits 
of union representation without having to pay to receive those 
benefits.5
In writing for the majority, Justice Alito asserted that public sec-
tor union activity necessarily involves speech that constitutes mat-
ters of “public concern”; compelling employees to support this 
speech through mandatory agency fees therefore runs afoul of 
non-union members’ First Amendment rights.6 But in the process 
of freeing non-union members from allegedly unconstitutional 
compelled speech, Justice Alito may have opened up government 
employers to liability for First Amendment violations from which 
the Court had previously protected them.7 Justice Alito’s reliance 
on an expansive definition of “public concern” puts the Janus deci-
1. 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
2. Alice O’Brien, Symposium: Janus’ Radical Rewrite of the First Amendment, SCOTUSBLOG
(June 27, 2018, 9:58 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/symposium-janus-radical-
rewrite-of-the-first-amendment/.
3. 431 U.S. 209 (1976).
4. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2460.
5. See, e.g., Alana Semuels, Is This the End of Public Sector Unions in America?, THE 
ATLANTIC (June 27, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/06/janus-
afscme-public-sector-unions/563879/.
6. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2460.
7. Id. at 2498 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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sion in conflict with employee workplace speech doctrine after 
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ.8 As Justice Kagan highlighted in her searing 
dissent, such a broad formulation of what constitutes a matter of 
public concern might render government entities subject to signif-
icantly more litigation on speech claims that had previously been 
foreclosed.9
Responding to this critique, Justice Alito pointed to the signifi-
cant difference in scale between individual employment disputes 
and collective union activity.10 But it’s unclear why this distinction 
should matter for First Amendment purposes. Further, the line-
drawing problems inherent to a test that turns on “scale” are signif-
icant. For example, during oral arguments for Janus, Justice Breyer 
struggled to find the appropriate line to determine when a re-
quested wage increase becomes a matter of public concern.11 Jus-
tice Sotomayor went a step further, suggesting that, according to 
the petitioner’s argument, any decision made by a public employer 
arguably affects the public fisc and is therefore a matter of public 
concern.12
If the dissenting justices’ perception of Janus’ expansion of the 
meaning of “public concern” is correct, how do lower courts con-
front this impending influx of employee speech claims of unprec-
edented scope? More importantly, how should courts deal with 
these claims in a manner that recognizes the unique role public 
employees play in our public discourse?
I propose that the Supreme Court adjust the Pickering balancing 
test by explicitly considering the public interest value of public 
employee speech. Specifically, I suggest that a third factor be add-
ed to the balancing test. Currently, when confronted with a public 
employee First Amendment claim, courts must balance only the 
rights of the employee as an individual citizen to comment on mat-
ters of public concern against her government employer’s interest 
in operating an effective workplace. My proposed amendment to 
the Pickering test would also require courts to explicitly incorporate 
the public interest value of the employee’s speech as a third, inde-
pendent factor of equal weight.
Incorporating the public value of employee speech into the Pick-
ering balancing test will make post-Janus First Amendment claims 
more manageable and ideologically consistent. It will reconcile the 
8. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
9. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2498 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 2472–73.
11. Transcript of Oral Argument at 64–65, Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., and Mun. 
Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (No. 16-1466).
12. Id. at 69–70.
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Court’s employee speech doctrine while still ensuring that employ-
ee speech on meaningful workplace matters is protected.
In Part I of this Note, I outline Supreme Court precedent on 
agency fees and public employee speech protections, highlighting 
the doctrinal tension Janus creates. Part II considers in more depth 
the public interest value of employee speech, which I will generally 
call “social value.” It also highlights a selection of existing pro-
posals for heightened First Amendment protections that would 
apply to sector- or situation-specific circumstances, proposals that I 
suggest would be better addressed in a more broadly applicable, 
modified balancing test. Part III discusses the proposed three-
pronged balancing test, illustrates some potential applications, and 
anticipates counterarguments.
I. Dueling Doctrines
This section lays out relevant Supreme Court precedent with re-
spect to public sector union agency fees, starting with Abood v. De-
troit Bd. of Educ.13 and ending with Janus.14 It then walks through the 
line of cases, originating under Pickering v. Bd. of Educ.,15 that gov-
erns employee First Amendment rights in the workplace. The shift-
ing contours of the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence, spe-
cifically as it is applied to workplace speech and agency fees, 
converge and become apparent in Janus, a point discussed at the 
closing of this section.
A. The Road to Janus
In Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., Detroit public school teachers 
filed suit against the Detroit Board of Education and the Detroit 
Federation of Teachers.16 The plaintiff teachers challenged the 
agency shop clause in the union’s collective bargaining agreement 
with the Board of Education.17 Under this arrangement, even 
teachers who did not wish to be members of the union were re-
quired to pay a specified amount, called an “agency fee,” that 
funded union activities.18 These activities included representation 
of the teachers in collective bargaining, grievance procedures, and 
13. 431 U.S. 209 (1976).
14. 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
15. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
16. 431 U.S. at 212.
17. Id. at 213.
18. Id. at 211.
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other workplace matters. However, it also included the union’s po-
litical activities, including its contributions to political candidates 
and lobbying expenses.19 The plaintiffs argued that this arrange-
ment violated the First Amendment rights of those non-member 
teachers who did not support the union’s activities.20
The Abood Court recognized that potential First Amendment 
problems existed in compelling employees to financially support 
their collective bargaining representative.21 Nonetheless, the Court 
upheld agency fees as constitutional, holding that the state’s inter-
est in labor peace was a compelling one that was legitimately served 
by the existing agency fee arrangement.22 This holding was con-
sistent with longstanding Supreme Court precedent that upheld 
the permissibility of agency fees under the Railway Labor Act. In 
those cases, the Court relied on congressional intent prioritizing 
stability in management-labor relations.23 For Congress, the re-
quirement that nonmembers pay agency fees facilitated labor 
peace by enabling unions’ exclusive representation of workers and 
thereby reducing worker-led strikes.24 Exclusive representation also 
ensured that unions had sufficient funds to advocate for their 
members’ interests.25
However, in Abood and its predecessors, the Court held a union’s
ability to require these fees was constitutional only if the funds 
generated by the fees were not used to further the union’s explicit-
ly ideological or partisan activities. Specifically, a union could only 
use these fees to fund activities related to its duties as a collective 
bargaining representative.26 The Court recognized that this may 
present a challenging line-drawing problem, as it may be difficult 
to discern an activity performed in the union’s role as the exclusive 
bargaining representative of public sector employees from a union 
activity which is expressly political.27 Nevertheless, due to 
longstanding precedent, congressional intent, and the fact that the 
arrangement had proved workable, the Court found its decision to 
be the correct balance to strike, holding that any interference with 
19. See id. at 213, 215.
20. Id. at 213.
21. Id. at 222.
22. Id. at 224–26.
23. See id. at 217–23 (discussing Railway Employees’ Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 
(1956) and Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961)).
24. See id. at 219 (discussing the holding of Hanson and highlighting that “Congress 
determined that it would promote peaceful labor relations to permit a union and an em-
ployer to conclude an agreement requiring employees who obtain the benefit of union rep-
resentation to share its cost, and that legislative judgment was surely an allowable one.”).
25. See id. at 220–21.
26. See id. at 235–36.
27. Id. at 236.
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employees’ First Amendment protections that may be presented by 
agency fees was “constitutionally justified.”28
Non-right-to-work states—those states that, prior to the decision 
in Janus, did require non-union-member public sector employees 
to pay agency fees to the union that represents their workplace29—
and their municipalities relied on Abood’s holding for decades in 
drafting their collective bargaining agreements with public em-
ployee unions.30 The Abood doctrine has remained “remarkably sta-
ble,” as Justice Kagan points out in her dissent in Janus, striking a 
balance between employees’ constitutional right to free expression 
and government entities’ right to regulate their workplaces via ex-
clusive bargaining agreements with unions representing their em-
ployees.31 As intended, for those states that chose to require them, 
agency fees had long facilitated government entities’ compelling 
interest in labor peace.32
Over thirty-five years later, the Supreme Court brought the issue 
of agency fees to the forefront in the dicta of two cases, Knox v. 
SEIU, Local 1000 33 and Harris v. Quinn.34 The petitioners in Knox
challenged the defendant union’s imposition of a one-time “Emer-
gency Temporary Assessment to Build a Political Fight Back 
Fund.”35 The Court found the fund, which was to be used for lob-
bying the California electorate on issues important to the union in 
upcoming elections, to be political in nature and therefore uncon-
stitutional under Abood.36 In Harris v. Quinn, the Court held in a 5-4
decision that the plaintiffs, home health care workers in Illinois, 
were not full-fledged state employees.37 Unlike other public work-
ers in Illinois, they could therefore not be compelled, under 
28. See id. at 217–23.
29. In contrast, states with right-to-work laws did not permit unions to require employ-
ees to pay dues in order to be members. See Right to Work Laws, WORKPLACE FAIRNESS,
https://www.workplacefairness.org/unions-right-to-work-laws (last visited Nov. 24, 2019).
30. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., and Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2487 
(2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
31. Id.
32. Brief for the States of N.Y., Alaska, Conn., Del., Haw., Iowa, Ky., Me., Md., Mass., 
Minn., N.J., N.M., N.C., Or., Pa., R.I., Vt., Va., and Wash., and the District of Columbia as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 12, Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., and Mun. 
Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (discussing the states’ experiences that “exclusive 
representation supported by agency fees can be an indispensable tool” in preventing the 
“devastating public-sector work stoppages that caused disruptions in critical government 
services”).
33. 567 U.S. 298 (2012).
34. 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2638–44 (2014).
35. Knox, 567 U.S. at 304.
36. See id. at 315.
37. See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2644.
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Abood’s authority, to join and pay dues to the union that represent-
ed similarly situated state employees.38
While the two cases were decided on these respectively narrow 
grounds, Justice Alito’s opinions raised the question of whether 
agency fees in general should be considered unconstitutionally 
compelled speech.39 In Knox, he highlighted that the Court’s past 
decisions authorizing unions to collect agency fees from nonmem-
ber employees and allowing them to operate through an opt-out 
system “approach, if they do not cross, the limit of the what the 
First Amendment can tolerate.”40 Justice Alito characterized these 
conditions as “substantial impingement[s]” on First Amendment 
rights and expressed concern with the extent of these infringe-
ments.41
In Harris, Justice Alito again highlighted portions of the reason-
ing in Abood as an “anomaly,” questioning the conclusion that 
agency fees were necessary to maintain the state’s interest in labor 
peace and suggesting they were not sufficiently narrowly tailored to 
that interest as to justify their significant intrusion on First 
Amendment rights.42 Justice Alito further argued that Abood failed 
to take into account the differences between the nature of core un-
ion issues in the public sector and the private sector; in the former, 
he asserted, core union issues inherently are political ones.43 Con-
sequently, there is a significant conceptual difficulty in drawing a 
line between issues related to the union’s role as a collective bar-
gaining agent and its political activities.44
Contemporary critics pointed out how Justice Alito’s musings 
appeared to run into conflict with Supreme Court precedent re-
garding employee speech protections under the First Amend-
ment,45 highlighting the opinion’s inconsistency46 and its incoher-
38. Id. at 2638–44.
39. Knox, 567 U.S. at 313–14.
40. Id. at 314.
41. Id. at 317.
42. Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2630–34.
43. Id. at 2632–33.
44. See id. at 2632.
45. Catherine L. Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Political Speech and Association Rights After 
Knox v. Seiu, Local 1000, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1023, 1065–67 (July 2013) (arguing in part 
that “[i]t appears that the only robust free speech rights government employees have is the 
right to refuse to support unions”).
46. Catherine Fisk, Harris v. Quinn Symposium: Court Departs from Federalism,
First Amendment Jurisprudence, SCOTUSBLOG (July 3, 2014, 10:28 AM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/07/harris-v-quinnsymposium-court-departs-from-
federalism-first-amendment-jurisprudence/.
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ence,47 and called on the Court to explain its doctrinal asymme-
tries.48
In his majority opinion in Janus, Justice Alito tied together the 
threads of dicta from Knox and Harris. Justice Alito asserted that 
public sector union activity, in general and in this specific case, in-
herently implicates many political issues that are considered to be 
of public concern.49 For example, petitioner Mark Janus was em-
ployed by the State of Illinois, which at the time of the ruling was 
suffering from severe budget problems, in part due to insufficiently 
funded public sector pensions.50 Former Republican Governor 
Bruce Rauner and the state’s public sector unions “disagree[d] 
sharply” as to how to appropriately resolve these issues.51 Under 
Justice Alito’s framing, this disagreement suggested that essential 
union matters like pension funding may ultimately be political dis-
putes at their core. Furthermore, the majority asserted, union 
speech during the collective bargaining process can broach signifi-
cant matters of public policy. As an example, Justice Alito pointed 
to the significant role public teachers’ unions and their collective 
bargaining processes play in public discourse surrounding “fun-
damental questions of education policy.”52 Consequently, compel-
ling employees to subsidize collective bargaining constituted com-
pelled speech on matters “overwhelmingly of substantial public 
concern.”53 For the majority, the Abood rule authorizing agency 
fees, so long as they were not put to use toward political purposes, 
had proven to be unworkable.54 Finally, the rule was formally over-
turned; under Janus, public sector unions can no longer require 
non-member public employees to pay agency fees for services ren-
dered without running afoul of those employees’ First Amendment 
rights.
47. See Jason Walta, Harris v. Quinn Symposium: Abood and the Limits of Cognitive Disso-
nance, SCOTUSBLOG (July 1, 2014, 12:49 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/07/harris-
v-quinn-symposium-abood-and-the-limits-of-cognitive-dissonance/.
48. See Samuel Bagenstos, Harris v. Quinn Symposium: The Coming Conflict in Public Em-
ployee Speech Law and the Immediate Risks to People with Disabilities, SCOTUSBLOG (June 30, 
2014, 9:46 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/harris-v-quinn-symposium-the-
coming-conflict-in-public-employee-speech-law-and-the-immediate-risks-to-people-with-
disabilities/.
49. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2475.
50. Id. at 2474–75.
51. Id. at 2475.
52. Id. at 2475–76.
53. Id. at 2476.
54. Id. at 2481–82.
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B. Pickering and its Successors
In a separate line of cases originating with Pickering v. Bd. of 
Educ.,55 the Supreme Court has shaped the contours of the free 
speech rights granted to individual public employees. Justices Alito 
and Kagan disagreed in their respective opinions about the influ-
ence the holding in Janus will have on this doctrine.
In Pickering, the plaintiff public school teacher was dismissed 
from his job for sending a letter to a local paper that was critical of 
the defendant Board of Education’s approach to raising revenue.56
The plaintiff challenged his dismissal, raising First and Fourteenth 
Amendment claims, and the Supreme Court ultimately found that 
his speech rights had been violated by the termination.57 The 
Court maintained that public employees do not relinquish their 
First Amendment rights on matters of public concern merely by 
accepting public employment.58 The Court also recognized, how-
ever, that the State’s interest in regulating its employees’ speech is 
different from its interest in regulating speech of the general pub-
lic.59 In so holding, the Court laid out a balancing test that lower 
courts must apply in assessing similar First Amendment claims as-
serted by public employees: When an employee argues that an ad-
verse action taken against him violated his First Amendment rights, 
courts must balance the interest of employees and their rights as 
citizens to comment on issues of public concern against the needs 
of the employer to effectively administer public services.60
The Pickering Court highlighted the social value of the plaintiff’s
speech in this case, stating that “[t]eachers are, as a class, the 
members of a community most likely to have informed and defi-
nite opinions as to how funds allotted to the operation of the 
schools should be spent.”61 In this way, it recognized the “special 
contribution” to public discourse that public employees are 
uniquely capable of making.62
55. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
56. Id. at 563.
57. Id. at 565.
58. Id. at 568.
59. Id.
60. See id. (“The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of 
the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interests of 
the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs 
through its employees.”).
61. Id. at 572.
62. Cynthia Estlund, Harmonizing Work and Citizenship, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 115, 119 
(2006).
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In Connick v. Myers, the respondent, an assistant district attorney, 
faced an unwanted transfer to a different role.63 In an attempt to 
avoid the transfer and communicate her displeasure with the pro-
posed change, she solicited input from her coworkers on the of-
fice’s transfer policy and other workplace conditions by way of a 
questionnaire.64 She was later terminated and told that her distri-
bution of the questionnaire constituted insubordination.65 Alt-
hough the respondent later filed suit alleging her First Amend-
ment speech rights had been violated, the Court found that her 
distribution of the questionnaire could not possibly be construed 
as affecting a matter of public concern, and that consequently, the 
Court was not required to scrutinize the reasons for her dis-
charge.66
Connick clarified that matters of personal interest—including 
most personnel issues—are not matters of public concern and 
therefore are not analyzed under the Pickering balancing test.67 It 
thus established the question of whether the implicated speech was 
a matter of public concern as a threshold inquiry for undergoing 
the Pickering test.68 The Court provided little guidance as to what 
should constitute a matter of public concern, only stating that the 
matter “must be determined by the content, form, and context of a 
given statement, as determined by the full record.”69
In the respondent’s case, the Court found that only one of the 
questions on her circulated questionnaire was a matter of public 
concern. The remaining questions did not concern the public and 
were instead extensions of her individual dispute over her trans-
fer.70 In the case of the single question that possibly implicated a 
matter of public concern—whether district attorneys were being 
pressured to support certain political campaigns—the Court found 
that posing the question had the potential to undermine office re-
lations and her supervisor’s authority, and that consequently, her 
termination did not violate her First Amendment rights.71 The 
63. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140 (1983).
64. Id. at 141.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 146.
67. Id. at 147.
68. Id. (“We hold only that when a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon mat-
ters of public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest, 
absent the most unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum in 
which to review the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in 
reaction to the employee’s behavior.”).
69. Id. at 147–48.
70. Id. at 148.
71. Id. at 154.
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Court refused to “constitutionalize the employee grievance” in the 
name of First Amendment protections.72
Garcetti v. Ceballos narrowed the scope of First Amendment-
protected employee speech even further than Connick already had 
by erecting a critical distinction between speech an employee en-
gages in as a citizen versus speech engaged in as an employee.73
The Court held in Garcetti that statements made pursuant to an 
employee’s official duties are not subject to the Pickering balancing 
test.74 The respondent, another prosecutor, wrote a memo recom-
mending dismissal of a case due to significant misrepresentations 
in an affidavit that had been used to execute a search warrant.75 His 
superiors proceeded with the prosecution anyway, and tension 
arose between the parties.76 Ceballos filed suit, alleging First and 
Fourteenth Amendment violations arising out of a series of actions 
he viewed as retaliatory.77
The Court again recognized the challenge of balancing public 
employees’ protected speech rights against the need for govern-
ment services to be provided efficiently, asserting that “[s]o long as 
employees are speaking as citizens about matters of public con-
cern, they must face only those speech restrictions that are neces-
sary for their employers to operate efficiently and effectively.”78
Nevertheless, the Court found that Ceballos was not speaking as a 
citizen for purposes of the First Amendment. It was not dispositive 
for the Court that Ceballos expressed his views in the office, nor 
was it dispositive that he was specifically speaking on the subject 
matter of his employment.79 Ultimately, what mattered was that 
Ceballos, in writing the memo, was acting pursuant to his duties as 
an employee and therefore not subject to the Pickering balancing 
test.80 The Garcetti Court thus erected a critical distinction between 
speech made as a citizen and speech made as an employee.81
72. Id.
73. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
74. Id. at 421.
75. Id. at 413–15.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 415.
78. Id. at 419 (emphasis added).
79. Id. at 420–21.
80. Id. at 421–22.
81. See Estlund, supra note 62, at 116 for a thorough discussion of the Garcetti Court’s
construction of “spheres of citizenship and of employment.”
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C. Doctrinal Conflict
In each of the post-Pickering cases, the Court narrowed individu-
al employee speech rights in the name of employer discretion and 
efficiency. While the Court has consistently recognized the chal-
lenging line-drawing problems presented by the holdings in these 
decisions, it has nevertheless upheld them, recognizing the validity 
of the competing interests at stake.82
This delineation is significantly more complicated in the wake of 
Justice Alito’s majority opinion in Janus. Arguably, the expansive 
conception of matters of public concern that Justice Alito articu-
lates in Janus creates space for significantly more litigants to meet 
the Pickering threshold inquiry. Justice Kagan raised precisely this 
point in her dissent:
So take your pick. Either the majority is exposing govern-
ment entities across the country to increased First Amend-
ment litigation and liability—and thus preventing them 
from regulating their workforces as private employers 
could. Or else, when actual cases of this kind come around, 
we will discover that today’s majority has crafted a “unions 
only” carve-out to our employee-speech law.83
Per Justice Kagan, the very activity that makes public employee un-
ion collective bargaining inherently political under Justice Alito’s
analysis would also be considered First Amendment-protected 
speech if it were to be raised in the context of an individual public 
employee speech claim analyzed under Pickering. Or, as law profes-
sor Catherine Fisk succinctly explained, “There is now a First 
Amendment right to refuse to engage in speech (paying union 
fees) where there is no First Amendment right to engage in the 
speech (about wages and benefits) that the person has a right not 
to subsidize.”84
82. For a thorough account of post-Pickering cases, see Joseph Oluwole, On the Road to 
Garcetti: ‘Unpick’ering Pickering and Its Progeny, 36 CAP. U.L. REV. 967 (2008) (arguing that 
the Supreme Court’s post-Pickering decisions have “regressively led to a quick ebb of free 
speech rights” and jurisprudence that strongly favors operational efficiency over the indi-
vidual speech rights of employees).
83. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., and Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2496 
(2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
84. Catherine L. Fisk, A Progressive Labor Vision of the First Amendment: Past as Prologue,
118 COLUM. L. REV. 2057, 2074–75 (2018).
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II. THE SOCIAL VALUE OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SPEECH
In this section, I will discuss a key aspect of Justice Souter’s dis-
sent in Garcetti and how it highlights a longstanding view, on the 
Court and in First Amendment scholarship, of the unique value of 
public employee speech on workplace matters. The Court has ar-
ticulated that principle and acknowledged its significance, but has 
not explicitly reflected that value in its balancing test for public 
employee speech on matters of public concern. I will conclude by 
highlighting the piecemeal solutions scholars have suggested as at-
tempts to carve out areas of protected speech that merit height-
ened protection and by offering arguments as to why a more com-
prehensive solution to the problem of public employee speech 
rights post-Janus is preferable.
In his dissenting opinion in Garcetti, Justice Souter argued that 
the mere act of receiving a public paycheck does nothing to dimin-
ish the value of public employees’ speech on public matters.85 In 
fact, given that the First Amendment protects not only the individ-
ual speaking but the public’s interest in that speech, the value of 
public employee speech on matters related to his official duties 
“may well be greater.”86 Consequently, Justice Souter would have 
rejected the categorical exclusion laid out by the majority in favor 
of an adjustment to the basic Pickering balancing test: “[A]n em-
ployee commenting on subjects in the course of duties should not 
prevail on balance unless he speaks on a matter of unusual im-
portance and satisfies high standards of responsibility in the way he 
does it.”87
While the Garcetti majority did not adopt Souter’s proposed ana-
lytic framework, it acknowledged “the importance of promoting 
the public’s interest in receiving the well-informed views of gov-
ernment employees engaging in civic discussion.”88 As law profes-
sor and labor and employment law scholar Cynthia Estlund notes, 
while the Court has been divided over whether individuals have a 
specific interest in protected speech, it has not been divided in its 
position over the value of that speech.89 Indeed, the Court has con-
sistently acknowledged the unique role of public servants com-
menting on matters of public concern, both before and after Gar-
cetti.90 Despite its apparent commitment to the social value of 
85. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 428 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 430–31.
87. Id. at 435 (emphasis added).
88. Id. at 419 (majority opinion).
89. Estlund, supra note 62, at 141–42.
90. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674 (1994) (acknowledging that 
“[g]overnment employees are often in the best position to know what ails the agencies for 
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public employee speech, its own recognition of that value in Garcet-
ti seems to be little more than “lip service.”91
A. Proposals for Protection
In light of the apparent value of certain public employee speech, 
scholars and commentators have highlighted problems unique to 
specific categories of speech or speakers. They have proposed tar-
geted solutions to confront these issues and to heighten speech 
protections in these tailored circumstances.
1. Whistleblowers & Leakers
Much has been written on the critical role whistleblowers play in
American self-governance, and the Supreme Court itself has 
acknowledged their particular importance.92 However, the Court 
has failed to recognize in a consistent, meaningful way the value of 
public employee speech to public discourse in its doctrine. In light 
of this failure, law professor Ronald Krotoszynski recently pro-
posed creating a new category of speech, which he calls “whistle-
blowing speech.”93 Krotoszynski argues for adopting a “modified 
Hand formula”94 in which a court would weigh the “gravity of the 
wrongdoing exposed by the government employee’s whistleblow-
ing speech” against the “probability of it being reported or discov-
ered by another source.”95
Similar arguments promote stronger First Amendment protec-
tions for government employees who leak confidential information 
obtained in the course of their official duties. Heidi Kitrosser, law 
professor and scholar of the law and policy of government secrecy, 
has suggested two standards for litigation against leakers.96 The 
first, applied during criminal prosecutions or civil actions “with 
which they work” but holding that a government need only have a reasonable belief that an 
employee made a sufficiently disruptive statement); Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2379 
(2014) (holding that the First Amendment protects truthful sworn testimony, compelled by 
subpoena, that occurs outside of ordinary job responsibilities, asserting that “anyone who 
testifies in court bears an obligation to the court and society at large, to tell the truth”).
91. Larry Spurgeon, The Endangered Citizen Servant: Garcetti vs. the Public Interest and Ac-
ademic Freedom, 39 J.C. & U.L. 405, 424–25 (2013).
92. See Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2379.
93. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Whistleblowing Speech and the First Amendment, 93 IND. L.J. 267, 
274 (2018).
94. Id. at 298.
95. Id. at 298 n.156.
96. Heidi Kitrosser, Leak Prosecutions and the First Amendment: New Developments and a 
Closer Look at the Feasibility of Protecting Leakers, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1221, 1264 (2015).
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substantial sanctions,” would require the government to show that 
a leaker “lacked an objectively reasonable basis to believe that the 
public interest in disclosure outweighed identifiable national secu-
rity harms.”97 The second, applied to actions with less severe sanc-
tions, would require the government to show that “the leaker 
lacked an objectively substantial basis” to believe the same.98
2. Academic Freedom
The Garcetti majority opinion left open the possibility that its 
analysis may apply differently to cases involving academic speech 
related to scholarship or teaching.99 Perhaps unsurprisingly, Garcet-
ti’s application to academic speech has been a point of discussion 
and concern amongst legal academics.100 In an effort to fill the gap 
the Supreme Court deliberately left open, law professor Joseph J. 
Martins proposes a modified balancing test that presumptively 
weighs in favor of public school professors.101 In published com-
mentary, practitioner Kimberly Gee proposes a modified Hazelwood
test,102 in which the school first conducts a forum analysis in order 
to determine whether the school intended the classroom to be an 
open or closed forum.103 If it is determined that the forum is a 
closed one, the teacher would then be subjected to regulations that
are “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical interests.”104
3. Law Enforcement Officers
Others have proposed law-enforcement specific protections. 
These arguments highlight the perverse incentives the Garcetti rule 
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425 (2006) (“We need not, and for that reason 
do not, decide whether the analysis we conduct today would apply in the same manner to a 
case involving speech related to scholarship or teaching.”).
100. See, e.g., Judith Areen, Government as Educator: A New Understanding of First Amendment 
Protection of Academic Freedom and Governance, 97 GEO. L.J. 945 (2009); see also Robert M. 
O’Neil et al., Protecting an Independent Faculty Voice: Academic Freedom after Garcetti v. Ceballos, 
95 ACADEME 67 (Nov.–Dec. 2009).
101. Joseph J. Martins, Tipping the Pickering Balance, 25 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 649, 
680 (2016).
102. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (holding that students’
rights were not violated when the school interfered with the paper’s content without the 
student authors’ and editors’ consent because the school newspaper was not a public fo-
rum).
103. Kimberly Gee, Establishing a Constitutional Standard that Protects Public School Teacher 
Classroom Expression, 38 J.L. & EDUC. 409, 449 (2009).
104. Id. at 450
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imposes on law enforcement officers, a class of employees from 
whom the public has a significant interest in hearing truthful ac-
counts of misconduct or mismanagement.105 For these reasons, 
professor Ann Hodges and independent practitioner Justin Pugh 
have suggested a return to the Pickering framework as it was applied 
pre-Garcetti.106 Similarly, in a journal comment, student Lemay Diaz 
highlights the value to the public of truthful testimony provided by 
police officers and other law enforcement officials, and suggests 
that truthful testimony provided even in the course of one’s official 
duties be considered protected citizen speech.107
4. Lawyers
Given lawyers’ proximity to the judicial system and the public’s
interest in ethical, well-functioning courts, lawyers are arguably in 
the best position to inform the public about problems within the 
judiciary.108 Consequently, law professor Terri Day has proposed 
reforming ethical restrictions on attorneys, noting that existing re-
strictions have a chilling effect on socially advantageous speech.109
Common to all of these proposals is the notion that specific 
types of public employee speech have unique value to public dis-
course, whether based upon situation- or profession-specific fac-
tors. The proposals for reform, however, range from ethical rule 
reform to abandoning Garcetti entirely. These disparate solutions to 
what appears to be a common underlying problem highlight the 
need for a more comprehensive rule change that can accommo-
date the fact-specific proposals in a holistic fashion.
III. A PICKERING TEST FOR THE POST-JANUS WORLD
In Janus, the Court broadened the scope of what constitutes a 
matter of public concern while weakening the citizen/employee 
distinction of Garcetti. In his majority opinion, Justice Alito did not 
appear concerned with this conflict, distinguishing Pickering from 
105. Ann Hodges & Justin Pugh, Crossing the Thin Blue Line: Protecting Law Enforcement 
Officers Who Blow the Whistle, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 1, 39 (June 2018).
106. Id. at 31.
107. Lemay Diaz, Comment, Truthful Testimony as the “Quintessential Example of Speech as a 
Citizen”: Why Lane v. Franks Lays the Groundwork for Protecting Public Employee Truthful Testimo-
ny, 46 SETON HALL L. REV. 565, 566–67 (2016).
108. Terri Day, Speak No Evil: Legal Ethics v. the First Amendment, 32 J. LEGAL PROF. 161, 
164 (2008).
109. Id. at 175.
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Abood as an issue of scale.110 For Justice Alito, it mattered greatly 
that cases decided under Pickering revolve around individual em-
ployment disputes, while Janus (and, by connection, Abood) dealt 
with blanket, employer-issued policies affecting many employees.111
But this response assumes the existence of a line, determined by 
“scale,” while providing lower courts with no reasonable way to dis-
cern where that line might be drawn. Furthermore, Justice Alito’s
strong emphasis on scale renders the Garcetti citizen/employee dis-
tinction nearly meaningless. The Garcetti distinction relies on the 
role of the speaker in determining whether the implicated speech is 
protected. If speech that is otherwise protected becomes unpro-
tected merely when articulated collectively, the core protection is 
rather weak, indeed. The doctrinal uncertainty Janus creates calls 
for a new test–one that recognizes the unique category of citizen-
as-public-employee and the special value this perspective brings.
In an attempt to offer such a comprehensive framework, I pro-
pose that the Supreme Court adopt a modified Pickering balancing 
test that highlights the public’s interest, under the First Amend-
ment, in the speech of public employees. This modified test should 
explicitly adopt a third factor to balance: the “social value” of the 
specific employee speech at issue and its benefit to public dis-
course. This factor would be of equal weight to the employee’s
right to comment on matters of public concern and the govern-
ment’s right to operate an effective and efficient workplace.
The Court has repeatedly articulated its commitment to the val-
ue of employee speech to the public and to civic discourse general-
ly. Basic theories of representative democracy, citizenship, and 
equality support the Court’s recognition of the public’s interest in 
public employee speech and that speech’s unique value to the pub-
lic. The Janus dissent concludes with the notion that the First 
Amendment was meant to protect democratic governance, a point 
discussed at length in legal scholarship.112 For example, law profes-
sor and noted First Amendment scholar Vincent Blasi famously 
promoted the important “checking value” that free speech has on 
110. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., and Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 
2472–73 (2018) (“Suppose that a single employee complains that he or she should have re-
ceived a 5% raise. This individual complaint would likely constitute a matter of only private 
concern and would therefore be unprotected under Pickering. But a public-sector union’s
demand for a 5% raise for the many thousands of employees it represents would be another 
matter entirely. . . . When a large number of employees speak through their union, the cat-
egory of speech that is of public concern is greatly enlarged, and the category of speech that 
is of only private concern is substantially shrunk.”).
111. Id. at 2457.
112. Id. at 2502 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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government functions.113 More recently, law professor and work-
place law expert Pauline Kim has written extensively on the public 
accountability value of employee speech.114 Cynthia Estlund writes 
on the “civic significance of public employment,”115 and professor 
Samuel Bagenstos argues there is social equality value to strong 
employee protections, including speech protections.116 The signifi-
cant public, social, and civic value of public employee speech has 
enjoyed longstanding constitutional, judicial, and scholarly sup-
port. Incorporating those principles into the Pickering balancing 
test as administered by an independent judiciary merely reflects 
those principles and furthers those goals.
Despite the theoretical foundations for the Court’s recognition 
of the value of employee speech, the Court’s actual implementa-
tion of those values has remained ambivalent, often buried in dic-
ta.117 Instituting this proposed test would give greater, more sub-
stantial weight to this important aspect of the First Amendment, 
creating space for more expansive employee speech protections. It 
would be consistent with the expanded scope of public concern in 
Janus and the weakened line between employee and citizen speech,
but would still avoid the Connick Court’s concern of constitutional-
izing the employee grievance.118
This modified test is preferable to carving out the specific areas 
of heightened protection outlined in Section II because of its 
comprehensiveness. At the same time, it accommodates those areas 
and addresses those concerns. For example, consider a whistle-
blower employed by a government body who faces adverse action 
for raising concerns about official misconduct. The employee 
brings suit to object to that punishment. Nothing necessarily pro-
tects the employee from punishment beyond the piecemeal land-
scape of whistleblower protection statutes. Under the existing Pick-
ering framework, a court could find that the government’s interest 
in maintaining a secure workplace far exceeds the individual em-
113. Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES.
J. 521, 527, 534 (1977).
114. Pauline T. Kim, Market Norms and Constitutional Values in the Government Workplace, 94 
N.C. L. REV. 601, 601 (2016).
115. Estlund, supra note 62, at 116–17.
116. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Employment Law and Social Equality, 112 MICH. L. REV. 225, 225 
(2013).
117. See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cty., 391 U.S. 
563, 572 (1968) (suggesting that teachers are most likely to have “informed and definite”
opinions about school expenditures and that it is accordingly “essential” that their free 
speech rights are preserved, but not discussing the value of their opinions further); Garcetti 
v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 428–29 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that First Amend-
ment protections for government employees regarding potential government misconduct 
“rests on something more” and is uniquely valuable).
118. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
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ployee’s right to that speech. But under the modified test and the 
third “social value” prong, courts could recognize the speech’s sig-
nificant value to the public, tipping the Pickering balance in favor of 
the discharged employee. The same goes for lawyers and law en-
forcement officers who publicize misconduct within their respec-
tive professions; the ability for courts to explicitly recognize the 
public value inherent to this speech would elevate these claims 
from routine employee/employer disputes to speech that serves 
the public good and emphasize that the speech should be protect-
ed as such.
Underlying each of those profession- or situation-specific pro-
posals is a recognition of the potential for public interest in and 
social value of the speech at issue. This proposed test is therefore a 
more flexible solution than the piecemeal exceptions. It allows for 
the aforementioned and other fact-specific circumstances to be 
addressed, permits judicial discretion, and facilitates the develop-
ment of a more consistent body of law.
Importantly, the test would not “constitutionalize the employee 
grievance.”119 Simple disputes over routine workplace matters spe-
cific to individuals are unlikely to have any cognizable public or so-
cial value. The proposed third Pickering prong, then, would not fac-
tor into a court’s decision, and the court would proceed as it 
otherwise would by weighing employee rights against employer 
prerogative. Similarly, speech by a public employee in the work-
place that arguably constitutes harassment or hate speech would be 
no more protected in this framework than in the existing Pickering
framework, as such speech would have no social value or benefit to 
public discourse.
Reformulating this longstanding test naturally raises some con-
cerns regarding implementation, judicial overreach, and Justice 
Alito’s focus on the matter of scale. These concerns, however, are 
surmountable, and none outweigh the benefits of the proposed re-
formulated test.
The Supreme Court should explicitly adopt the modified three-
prong Pickering test if given the opportunity. The test alone admit-
tedly does not provide much guidance or structure to the lower 
courts that will be tasked with implementing it, but lower courts 
should be affirmatively given flexibility to provide content to the 
new “social value” prong. Flexibility is one of the key benefits of 
this test over other piecemeal solutions that have been proposed. 
Cases arising under workplace speech claims are very fact specific 
and require flexible solutions. In light of the need for specificity 
119. Connick, 461 U.S. at 154.
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and flexibility, lower courts should be given freedom to develop 
the new social value prong, as they are the courts of first instance 
with direct access to the facts of a case. Lower courts would thus be 
able to tailor the new prong to the wide range of fact-specific cases 
while still upholding the Court’s longstanding interest in the social 
value of public employee speech. In doing so, courts will develop a 
body of case law that gives content and shape to the category of 
what may constitute speech of such social value.
Concerns with lower courts’ implementation of the revised test 
also suggest hesitation with judicial overreach and policymaking, as 
there may be risks inherent in setting judges free to evaluate the 
“social value” of speech with little guidance, oversight, or limita-
tions. The majority opinion in Garcetti found existing “whistleblow-
er protection laws and labor codes . . . available to those who seek 
to expose wrongdoing” to be satisfactory, offering sufficient protec-
tion for whistleblowing employees.120 Heightened constitutional 
protection (which would presumably have been administered by 
the judiciary) was therefore not warranted. This was a poorly sup-
ported and shortsighted conclusion. The courts cannot reasonably 
defer to elected officials on speech claims that arise when those of-
ficials, or those subject to appointment or removal by elected offi-
cials, are operating in a managerial capacity. This is particularly 
true when the speech at issue reflects negatively on the govern-
ment or individual implicated actors. There is apparent conflict 
between public officials’ obligations to the public interest and their 
interest in self-preservation, career advancement, and reputation. 
It is unreasonable to expect government actors themselves to pro-
tect the public’s interest in this way, and it is therefore appropriate 
to permit judicial intervention in the form of a judicially adminis-
tered test to uphold these fundamental rights.
Even if one does not believe that public officials will face per-
verse incentives if left solely responsible for enacting and enforcing 
robust whistleblower protection laws, the existing web of statutory 
protections for whistleblowers is nonetheless insufficient to protect 
the broad range of socially valuable public employee speech. Much 
valuable speech falls outside of the scope of official whistleblowing 
“defined in the classic sense of exposing an official’s fault to a third 
party or to the public,” as Souter discusses in his Garcetti dissent.121
In deciding that agency fees represent unconstitutionally com-
pelled speech, the Janus majority opinion itself discusses the wide-
ranging issues of public concern addressed in collective bargaining 
120. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425.
121. Id. at 440 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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agreements, including “sensitive political subjects” like “education, 
child welfare, healthcare, and minority rights.”122 Public employees 
may have unique insights into these issues by virtue of their prox-
imity and access to civic institutions; their speech on such issues 
deserves protection beyond that afforded to whistleblowers as they 
are traditionally understood.
As previously discussed, Justice Alito relies heavily on the issue of 
scale in determining whether public employee union speech con-
stitutes a matter of concern. It could be argued that the proposed 
test does not sufficiently respond to Justice Alito’s concern with 
scale as a key fact distinguishing speech of public employee unions 
from individual claims, and thereby does little to resolve the line-
drawing problem that Justice Alito’s position creates. However, as 
discussed, Justice Alito’s line is neither clear nor a given; if four 
Supreme Court justices expressed such vigorous dissent and confu-
sion at the line, that delineation is arguably not intuitive. If scale 
considerations alone are not clear or sufficient, judges must be 
drawing on some other assessment in making their determinations 
as to what constitutes a matter of public concern. What this modi-
fied test provides, then, is a more concrete avenue through which 
judges can articulate the implicit but unstated assessments they are 
making when they designate topics as matters of public concern. 
Judges should be forced to articulate these processes of reasoning. 
This modified test provides a workable framework that forces them 
to do so explicitly.
CONCLUSION
Janus v. AFSCME Council 31 has thrown public employee First 
Amendment doctrine into disarray. By collapsing Garcetti’s citi-
zen/employee speech distinction and broadening the scope of 
speech that addresses matters of public concern, the Supreme 
Court at best created confusion for the lower courts. At worst, it 
created Kagan’s feared “unions-only” carve-out to employee speech 
protections. A clarification is therefore necessary—one that is con-
sistent not only with the changes made in Janus, but also with the 
Court’s longstanding recognition of the value of public employee 
speech to public discourse. A modified Pickering test that explicitly 
balances the public interest value of public employee speech would 
give the Court’s seemingly disparate decisions some ideological 
122. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., and Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 
2475–76 (2018).
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consistency and, importantly, would reaffirm a respect for the criti-
cal role of First Amendment speech protections in democratic self-
governance and the unique role of a public servant therein.
